Views and opinions expressed on this blog are solely my own and do not reflect views of any organizations or employers with whom I am affiliated.
Showing posts with label Priority. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Priority. Show all posts

Saturday, June 21, 2014

Valuing Multiemployer Pension Liability For Investments





In my previous post, I shared some background information about multiemployer pension plans and discussed the possible impact of these plans, specifically as it relates to bankruptcy. In this post, I want to talk more about disclosures of multiemployer pension liabilities, and how these disclosures can be used for valuation purposes.

FASB Required Disclosures:
Under the previous disclosure rules set by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), employers who contributed to multiemployer plans were only required to disclose their own historical contributions. FASB's Accounting Standards Update No. 2011-09 presented a new set of disclosure requirements for public companies participating in the plans, effective December 2011.

The new rules require:
  • Identifying plan information. 
  • The employer’s level of participation in the plan:
    • Contributions made for each period of Income Statement 
    • Whether the contributions represent more than 5% of total contributions to the plan 
  • The financial health of the plan:
    • The most recently available funded status:
      •  < 65% funded (red zone)
      •  65-80% funded (yellow zone)
      •  > 80% funded (green zone)
  • As of the end of the most recent year presented:
    • Whether a funding improvement plan or rehabilitation plan has been implemented or was pending; and
    • Whether a surcharge has been paid to the plan by the employer.
  • Information about when the collective bargaining agreements and when are set to expire.

The ASU notes that factors other than the amount of the employer’s contribution to a plan (e.g., the severity of the underfunded status of the plan) may need to be considered when determining whether a plan is significant. (Moody, Famiglietti & Andronico).


YRCW:

So now that we know what must be disclosed, let's look at a real-life disclosure. I've chosen YRCW which, as a less-than-truckload service provider, is comprised of 78% union workers and contributes to 32 separate multiemployer plans. The company contributed a total of $88.7 million to multiemployer pension plans in 2013, or approximately 34% of adjusted EBITDA. (YRCW 10-K)

The company contributed $52 million in both 2012 and 2013 to the Central States, Southwest and Southwest Areas Pension Fund (CSSSA), which represents the Company's largest contribution to one multiemployer plan. The disclosure looks like this (I've reorganized the exhibit to make it more visible; take a look at page 66 of the 10-K for more details).




























Notice the CSSSA is in the red zone, so as an investor, I'd want to find out what that plan looks like. Since we have an EIN Number, we can look up the most recent funding data on the Department of Labor's website. Since CSSSA is a prodigious plan, we can get funding information directly from the CSSSA's site.


The 2013 Annual Report for this plan provides exactly the kind of information that we need to do one more layer of analysis on the risk pertaining to this specific plan. Here, we find out that the plan's assets were valued at $18.7 billion on a mark-to-market basis and the plan was approximately 52% funded as of 2013. The plan's total contributions by employers for 2012 were $764,042,58, of which YRCW made up 6.8% (at $52.1 million).


Estimating Future Payments

An obvious way to incorporate liabilities for multiemployer pension plans in an investment analysis is to estimate future contributions and include them as operating expenses and as part of cash flow. The less obvious part of this is figuring out what the expense ought to be.

At times, the company will provide guidance for future cash outflow expected for multiemployer  pension plans. If not, the financial statements of the funds will provide projected contributions in the coming years. You can use the percent of contributions from the previous year and total contributions projected for the upcoming year to estimate the expense.

CSSSA expects total contributions in 2014 to be approximately $632 million. Using YRCW's 2012 contribution percent of 6.8%, we can estimate YRCW's 2014 payments to be around $43 million. As an investor, you can dig a little deeper to find out if future contribution number is closer to $43 million or 2012's number of $52 million. That is, you can do a little more work to find out how many beneficiaries YRCW supports via CSSSA and what the average payment per those beneficiaries is likely to be in the next year.

Employer Risk:
Major types of risk to a particular multiemployer plan from contributing employers are:

  1. Financial stability risk from contributors
  2. Upcoming collective bargaining agreements 
  3. Any increases in contributions required from employers 

     1. The form 5500 is required to list major employer participants and their contribution levels. From a risk perspective, it is important to look at financials of these major participants to assess the companies' ability to continue making fund contributions. In the case of CSSSA, the other big contributor (besides YRCW) is ABF Freight, which has a total of 114 pension accounts with the fund.

     2. Moreover, the form lists the expiration dates of collective bargaining agreements and the number of accounts that the agreements will impact. For example, YRC has 240 accounts for which a collective bargaining agreement expires on 3/31/2015. The negotiations leading up to the expiration date could result in volatility in the securities' prices and lead to operational risks.


     3. The notes to the financial statements of the fund will also have information about any aberration of contributions or withdrawal from the fund. In this case, the notes indicate that YRCW entered into a Contribution Deferral Agreement ("CDA") in June 2009:


"YRC’s outstanding balances under the CDA at December 31, 2012 and 2011 were $84.4 million and $90.2 million, respectively...YRCW is assumed to remain on the Distressed Employer Schedule and make Primary Schedule contribution rate increases beginning in 2015." Form 5500, 2012.


From an investment perspective, it would be important to find out what the increase in rate will mean in terms of increased cash outflow for the company. For YRCW, the Contractual Obligations Section of the 10-K tells us that that pension deferral obligations due in 0 to 4 years equals $136 million. This includes all possible pension deferral obligations, not just those due to CSSA.


The question from a modeling perspective would be: in what quarters will these cash outflows occur? Then, I would do a liquidity analysis to make sure that there would be enough cash/revolver available to fund these outflows without a detriment to interest payments.


Plan Holdings: 

An important variable to expected returns from a particular plan is the asset allocation of funds. The form 5500 gives a detailed breakdown of the assets in the fund, including cost and current value of bonds and stocks. The data is likely old by the time we get the form 5500 (The one for 2013 isn't out yet), but the funding notice is more current and has a broad asset allocation table. An incredibly persnickety investor could do his own valuation of the fund based on the asset allocation information. In general, I will just use the market values for the assets and increase the possible future liabilities if the assets in the fund look particularly risky.


A&M Valuation: 

Alvarez and Marsal had an article recently on risks associated with investing in companies with multiemployer plans. There's some useful insight in the paper concerning impact of these pension plans in M&A transactions. In terms of valuation, the article states:


"In lieu of detailed projections, we recommend that a buyer contemplating the purchase of a business that participates in a “red zone” plan consider a minimum 10 percent increase in per annum contributions as a conservative starting point; in some cases, the annual increase could be as high as 20 percent." A&M


Liens on Assets: 
This part is probably the most important for bond-holders, especially those worried about a bankruptcy. In some cases, a withdrawal or deferral liability to a multiemployer pension fund may be secured by a lien on certain assets, which would then reduce any asset value available for unsecured bondholders and equity holders.

For example, CSSSA requires that any Distressed Employer:


"Provides the Fund with first lien collateral in any and all unencumbered assets to the fullest extent it is able in order to fully secure (i) any delinquent or deferred Contribution obligations owed to the Fund, (ii) the Employer’s obligation to make current and future pension contributions to the Fund, and (iii) any future withdrawal liability potentially incurred by the Employer (with the amount of such potential withdrawal liability to be determined based on estimates to be provided by the Fund)."


So I would make sure to find out which assets are encumbered by pension liabilities and adjust my valuation accordingly.


One Last Thing: I've ignored the validity of basic assumptions of pension accounting in this case, such as the discount rates and expected rate of returns used by specific plans. You can read more about those rules and assumptions on the American Academy of Actuaries website.


Friday, May 23, 2014

Multiemployer Pension Plans, Bankruptcy and Twinkies


I've been meaning to do some research on multiemployer pension plans and how they are treated in bankruptcies, mainly because as an investor, it is difficult to value a company that participates in one of these plans. In this post, I will give a background of multiemployer pension plans, their challenges, and proposed reforms. In the next post, I will discuss liability disclosures and valuation of companies from an investment standpoint. Hostess is a good case study for this topic because we see the impact of a bankruptcy on other employers that contribute to the multiemployer pensions. 

When Hostess filed for bankruptcy in 2012, the world was aghast at the possibility losing the "golden sponge cake with creamy filling" called the Twinkie. The filing came just a few years after completing a an earlier restructuring and purchase by Ripplewood Holdings. The pastry maker cited pension and medical benefits obligations for its financial downfall. At the time, Hostess employed 18,500 employees, 83% of which were were union members. Bloomberg

Then, Apollo and Metropoulos used their resurrection stone to bring back the famed confectioner from the dead. The private equity firms won against a crowded bidding pool to acquire certain assets of Hostess in a 363 asset sale for $410 million in cash (Apollo Press Release). But even as the carb-laden sweets came back, many of the jobs did not. 

"Hostess had two main unions when it went under: About 6,600 employees were members of a bakers' union and worked at 33 bakeries nationwide, and 7,500 were drivers who belonged to the Teamsters union.

Some of the reduction in jobs is due to the new owners' different business model. Instead of using truck drivers as salesmen to deliver the product and stock the shelves of about 50,000 stores, the new company will hire outside trucking firms to deliver trailers full of the product to retail distribution centers.

Some jobs won't be coming back due to the permanent shutting of nearly 600 outlet stores the old Hostess Brands operated to sell products directly to consumers."  CNN Money. 

The Chapter 11 filing of Hostess had another unfortunate impact: multiemployer pension funds in which Hostess was involved. Here's a little more background on multiemployer pension plans: 

"Multiemployer plans are collectively-bargained pension plans that are maintained by two or more employers. In a multiemployer plan, there is joint and several financial liability between all employers in the plan." (US Chamber of Commerce). 

"When Hostess Brands Inc. went bankrupt in 2012, it triggered anxiety among employees at Ottenberg’s Bakery, a family-owned enterprise in Maryland. The companies shared a pension plan, and if Hostess couldn't pay its retirees, Ottenberg’s would have to pick up the tab." Bloomberg. 

Afraid of a domino affect (and probably the wrath of the Teamsters), the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) paid for the retirement benefits of 350 former Hostess Brands employees who were members of the Bakery and Sales Drivers Local 33 Industry Pension Fund. The remaining people covered under the Bakery and Sales Fund will be merged with another plan to protect benefits of workers in multiemployer funds. 

While this can be reminiscent of Chrysler, the important distinction is that this specific funding for the retirees isn't coming from Hostess lenders; it's coming from the PBGC which charges premiums for these kinds of guarantees. 

But it's not as if bankruptcy didn't play a role in the fate of the multiemployer plan. When a company decides to either completely or partially withdraw from a multiemployer plan, it faces withdrawal liabilities that are considered debt. (Fox Rothschild).  

"The Bankruptcy Code is wreaking havoc on multiemployer pension plans by providing an escape hatch from employer withdrawal liability, as recently highlighted by In re Hostess Brands, Inc. By taking advantage of bankruptcy courts, employers are able to discharge their Early Withdrawal Liabilities (EWL) as a debt and as a result avoid paying millions or even billions of dollars in EWL to pension plans." Villanova Law Review.

And importantly, from a debt-holder's perspective, the withdrawal liabilities are considered pari to unsecured debt. According to Marketwatch, Hostess' unsecured debt will recover between 12-42%, surely impacted by multiemployer plan claims, while bank loans will recover 27-80%. 

And then, there's the PBGC, which is also in perilous shape. Here's what The New York Times Dealbook  has to say: 

"The P.B.G.C. is supposed to be self-supporting, financing its operations with premiums paid by companies rather than tax dollars. Its single-employer program has the power to take over company pension funds before they run out of money so the assets can be used to help defray the costs. But the multiemployer program must wait until a failing plan’s investments are exhausted, so it gets nothing but bills. It now has premiums of about $110 million a year to work with. All it would take is the failure of one big plan to wipe out the whole program."

Institutional Investor also has a report on management of multiemployer funds and the Teamsters' role in pension plans. 

There's a lot of interest in overhauling the way multiemployer plans and their withdrawal liabilities work. Recently, the National Coordinating Committee for Multiemployer Plans issued a report called "Solutions not Bailouts". The reform outlined in this plan address offers remedies such as limiting withdrawal liabilities and providing the trustees with the flexibility of reducing benefits for deeply troubled plans. 

Given the all-time highs of the stock market, the underlying assets in the multiemployer funds are probably helping many of the funds to stay afloat. Hopefully, we'll have a change in the current multiemployer benefit system before stocks turn south, taking valuation of many of the funds in the same direction. 

In the meantime, it is important to think critically about investments in industries such as construction, entertainment, manufacturing, mining and transportation, which utilize the multiemployer pension plans, since their pension liabilities could be greater than expected. In my next post, I will take a closer look at assessing pension liability disclosures to help make investment decisions. 

Monday, April 21, 2014

Betting on Casinos, Part I


One of my friends sent me a Barron's article on Caesars' stock from last week and suggested that it would be a good topic to discuss. It is indeed a good topic because it involves a farrago of issues such as equity valuation, a complex capital structure and an alleged distress situation.

"Caesars (ticker: CZR), which has been gearing up for legalization, has one of the leading brands in its World Series of Poker. Yet the shares look overpriced because the debt-laden company has little going for it besides a future in online poker. Its current market value of about $2 billion assumes legalization of online poker at state and federal levels and significant profits from what is likely to be a very competitive business." Barron's

The company only issued 1% of its outstanding stock in it's IPO, and Barron's claims that volatility in stock price and the alacrity with which shares were scooped up is due to a scarcity of supply. 

Importantly, the company is encumbered by so much debt that any equity value would be elusory. 

"There appears to be little or no equity value in Caesars' core business given the ugly financials. Yet the IPO prospectus shows Caesars carved out its online business, including the World Series of Poker, into a separate unit unencumbered by debt. This means Caesars equity holders should get all the online profits; hence the investor focus." Barron's

There are two issues that I have with betting on the online gaming business for Caesars: 

1) Just because the online gaming business is in a separate unit that is unencumbered by debt does not mean that its proceeds cannot be used to pay for the debt that has a parent guarantee. 

2) I'm not sure if online gaming is as lucrative as the gaming industry would have us believe. 

I'm going to discuss the first issue in this post and the second issue in the next post. For starters, here's the organization structure according to Caesars' website in a presentation dated December 4, 2013:

Notice that the public shareholders hold shares in the Parent company, Caesars Entertainment Corp. The online gaming portion is held in a separate entity called Caesars Interactive Entertainment, as the Barron's article stated. 

"Caesars Interactive Entertainment, Inc. ("CIE"), which is a majority owned subsidiary of CGP LLC, operates an online gaming business providing for certain real money games in Nevada, New Jersey, and the United Kingdom; "play for fun" offerings in other jurisdictions; and social games on Facebook and other social media websites and mobile application platforms, such as Slotomania. CIE also owns the World Series of Poker ("WSOP") tournaments and brand, and licenses trademarks for a variety of products and businesses related to this brand." CZR 2013 10K 

So let's break down the debt level at various subsidiaries. According to the Prospectus Supplement for CZR Stock, CEOC has $15.8 billion of debt, CERP has $4.6 billion of debt and CGP has $721k of debt. Total debt on CZR's balance sheet, therefore, is a little over $19 billion. CGP has an additional $1.1 billion of debt that is associated with a recent acquisition of four properties from the Parent. 

Even though CIE does not have any debt outstanding, that does not mean that all of its earnings go to public shareholders. The reason is that the shares are issued at the Parent level or Caesars Entertainment Corporation (CZR). Moreover, of the $19 billion of debt listed on the balance sheet, at least $15 billion of that is stated in the prospectus as Guaranteed by the Parent or Guaranteed by the Parent and certain other subsidiaries. What that implies is, in the case of a bankruptcy, at least $15 billion of debt is still considered an unsecured obligation by the parent and is still ahead of the equity claims. 

Now that we know that there really is a substantial amount of debt ahead of the equity, the shares can be valued on the likelihood of the Parent being unable to meet its debtors' obligations. 

There is some real concern of Caesars being able to meet its debt obligations. Caesars' latest sale of four casinos to CGP has raised some eyebrows. 

"Caesars Entertainment Corp. (CZR)’s $2.2 billion property sale to an affiliate raises the chances the world’s most-indebted casino operator will force a restructuring of its bonds at a loss to investors.

By selling four casinos to Caesars Growth Partners LLC, the unprofitable company will receive proceeds that Chief Executive Officer Gary Loveman said will help pay down loans. That may help the company persuade those lenders to amend its credit agreements, allowing it to restructure high-cost bonds on more attractive terms, according to CreditSights Inc.
This week’s transaction means the operating unit “will have far fewer assets in Las Vegas where the market is improving -- it will be left with Atlantic City assets where the market continues to basically tank,” Kim Noland, an analyst at Gimme Credit LLC, said in an e-mail. Anticipated future steps will include a distressed-debt exchange and possibly the removal of the parent guarantee." Bloomberg
And the bondholders aren't sitting idly by. Second-lien bondholders of Caesars Entertainment Operating Co., such as Canyon Capital Advisors, Oaktree Capital Management and Appaloosa Management (which, full disclosure, is my former employer), have sent a letter to Caesars Entertainment Corp that alleges that its operating unit is insolvent and that some of its intercompany transactions constitute fraudulent transfers. 
"Still, if the second-lien bondholder group formally litigated and succeeded in court, the lenders could simply get their money back, which wouldn't be a very rewarding result.
In a worst-case scenario, however, CEOC could file for bankruptcy, in which case the new lenders' claims could be subject to a stay and could be invalidated." The Deal Pipeline

If the bondholders are right and CEOC is insolvent, files for bankruptcy or restructures, CZR could be on the hook for making its guaranteed debt as close to whole as possible. Thus, the equity value could be diminutive considering the $15 billion of debt that is guaranteed by the parent is issued by CEOC.

The other obstacle for the stock could be CGP which wholly owns CIE, the unit with the online gaming business. CGP also has a substantial amount of debt associated with it, $770 million of which is on the balance sheet and $1.1 is billion associated with acquisition of the above properties. That debt is an unsecured obligation of CGP, so if CGP has to restructure, any equity that would have been generated from CIE would also be diminished. 

Thus, I think pricing CZR stock is less of an exercise in valuing the online business and much more of an exercise in valuing CZR's subsidaries that have issued bonds with Parent guarantees.